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 The excellent articles by Brian Bornstein and Sean McCabe1 and 
Jennifer Robbennolt2 in this Symposium document the current state 
of two longstanding debates in jury scholarship—one on the external 
validity of mock jury experiments, the other on the relative fact-
finding ability of juries versus judges. Over a decade ago, I examined 
the state of evidence in each debate.3 With respect to what Bornstein 
and McCabe refer to as “consequentiality”—the question of whether 
decisions result in real outcomes4—in 1989 I noted that 
“[e]xperiments comparing mock jurors with subjects who thought 
they were actually trying a case have been inconclusive; different 
studies have found mock jurors’ verdicts to be more lenient, less leni-
ent, and no different from those of ‘actual’ jurors.”5 Bornstein and 
McCabe note with some frustration that there is no new evidence to 
clarify these results6—indeed, no studies have examined the issue 
since 1986.7 In stark contrast, Robbennolt shows that there has been 
considerable empirical progress on the second issue since 1993,8 
when I was able to identify only two direct experimental comparisons 
of judge and juror judgmental performance.9  
                                                                                                                    
 * Professor of Law and Professor of Public Policy, University of California at Berke-
ley. 
 1. Brian H. Bornstein & Sean G. McCabe, Jurors of the Absurd? The Role of 
Consequentiality in Jury Simulation Research, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 443 (2005). 
 2. Jennifer K. Robbennolt, Evaluating Juries by Comparison to Judges: A Bench-
mark for Judging?, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 469 (2005). In the interest of full disclosure, I re-
cently coauthored a paper with Robbennolt. See Jennifer K. Robbennolt, John M. Darley & 
Robert J. MacCoun, Symbolism and Incommensurability in Civil Sanctioning: Decision 
Makers as Goal Managers, 68 BROOK. L. REV. 1121 (2003). 
 3. Robert MacCoun, Inside the Black Box: What Empirical Research Tells Us About 
Decisionmaking by Civil Juries, in VERDICT: ASSESSING THE CIVIL JURY SYSTEM 137 pas-
sim (Robert E. Litan ed., 1993) [hereinafter MacCoun, Inside the Black Box]; see also Rob-
ert J. MacCoun, Experimental Research on Jury Decision-Making, 244 SCIENCE 1046, 
1046-50 (1989) [hereinafter MacCoun, Experimental Research].  
 4. See Bornstein & McCabe, supra note 1, at footnote 450-52. 
 5. MacCoun, Experimental Research, supra note 3, at 1046. 
 6. Bornstein & McCabe, supra note 1, at footnote 452. 
 7. See id. at 452 n.39, 453 tbl.1. 
 8. Robbennolt, supra note 2, at ____. 
 9. See MacCoun, Inside the Black Box, supra note 3, at 166 (citing Edmund S. Howe 
& Thomas C. Loftus, Integration of Intention and Outcome Information by Students and 
Circuit Court Judges: Design Economy and Individual Differences, 22 J. APPLIED SOC. 
PSYCHOL. 102 (1992); and Gary L. Wells, Naked Statistical Evidence of Liability: Is Subjec-
tive Probability Enough?, 62 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 739 (1992)). 
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 Perhaps framing these questions as “debates” is misleading, since 
in neither case can we expect empirical research to provide an un-
equivocal, dichotomous verdict like “mock jury research is valid” or 
“judges are superior.” Both issues involve inevitable trade-offs among 
goals—epistemological goals in the first case and legal policy goals in 
the second. 
I.   THE REALISM OF JURY RESEARCH 
 The “realism” of the mock jury paradigm involves at least three 
dimensions: whether the “stimulus case” materials resemble actual 
trials, whether the samples resemble real jury pool populations, and 
whether the psychology of assessing fictional cases resembles what 
jurors experience when reaching real verdicts involving real liti-
gants. Brian Bornstein has already made a major contribution to our 
understanding of the first two dimensions; his 1999 meta-analysis of 
twenty years of mock jury research found little indication that either 
stimulus case realism (for example, paper-pencil versus audiotape 
versus videotape) or study population (for example, student versus 
general community) systematically influences research conclusions.10 
It is difficult to avoid the conclusion that efforts to maximize realism 
on these dimensions have more to do with research marketing than 
scientific validity; whether the marketing payoff is worth the tre-
mendous opportunity costs is an open question that funders ought to 
take seriously.11 
 Readers outside the jury research community might be surprised 
to find so little attention given to the third dimension—the conse-
quentiality issue. But this neglect is understandable, given the small 
size and limited resources of the jury research community. A handful 
of prior studies with inconsistent results provides little incentive for 
investing the considerable effort in a new experiment, unless some-
thing important is at stake—an unresolved legal policy debate (for 
example, jury size or bifurcating damages) or a competition among 
basic theories of juror judgment (for example, “cognitive averaging” 
versus story-based or constraint satisfaction models12). Perhaps new 
research on consequentiality would persuade policymakers to take 
mock jury research more seriously—at least if consequentiality 
                                                                                                                    
 10. Brian H. Bornstein, The Ecological Validity of Jury Simulations: Is the Jury Still 
Out?, 23 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 75 (1999). 
 11. Videotaped trial reenactments, the use of jury pool volunteers, and mock jury de-
liberations conducted in courthouse settings add greatly to the expense and duration of an 
experiment; a junior researcher could plausibly conduct three or four low-fidelity experi-
ments in university settings with the same or less time and money. 
 12. See INSIDE THE JUROR: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF JUROR DECISION MAKING (Reid 
Hastie ed., 1993) [hereinafter INSIDE THE JUROR]; MacCoun, Experimental Research, supra 
note 3; Robbennolt, Darley & MacCoun, supra note 2.  
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proved inconsequential. But the issue seems unlikely to be the only 
(or even a major) obstacle to having our research findings drive ma-
jor legal policy decisions. Far from being unique to the mock jury lit-
erature, the complaint that policymakers ignore social science re-
search seems nearly universal.13 
 A lack of real decision consequences, on its face, seems relevant to 
the assessment of mock jury research. But as Bornstein and McCabe 
point out, there are qualitatively distinct ways in which outcomes in 
mock and real jury trials might systematically differ: a variable 
might have a greater effect on verdicts in one setting than in the 
other, it might influence outcomes in one setting but have no effect 
on other, or it might affect each setting in opposite ways.14 Though it 
is easy to see how realism might influence the magnitude of particu-
lar correlations among evidentiary or procedural factors and ver-
dicts,15 it is hard to identify compelling reasons why mock and actual 
juror reasoning might differ systematically in kind, rather than de-
gree. Various theories in the behavioral science judgment and deci-
sion literatures address the realism question, but as far as I can tell, 
none predict important qualitative differences of the sort that would 
make mock jury research misleading. 
 The most straightforward possibility is that real jurors may try 
harder than mock jurors—think harder, deliberate longer, and pon-
der more deeply. The widely influential “elaboration likelihood 
model” of Richard Petty and John Cacioppo has stimulated a great 
deal of research on the effects of motivation on reasoning and per-
suasion.16 That work shows that information in the environment 
(whether verbal arguments, visual evidence, or other nonverbal 
stimuli) can influence opinion formation via one of two qualitatively 
different routes.17 The “central route” involves systematic “elabora-
                                                                                                                    
 13. See, e.g., DAVID GREENBERG ET AL., SOCIAL EXPERIMENTATION AND PUBLIC 
POLICYMAKING (2003); RICHARD P. NATHAN, SOCIAL SCIENCE IN GOVERNMENT: USES AND 
MISUSES (1988); THE POLITICS OF NUMBERS (William Alonso & Paul Starr eds., 1987); Rob-
ert J. MacCoun, Biases in the Interpretation and Use of Research Results, 49 ANN. REV. 
PSYCHOL. 259 passim (1998). 
 14. See Bornstein & McCabe, supra note 1, at 452-57; see also Robert M. Bray & Nor-
bert L. Kerr, Use of the Simulation Method in the Study of Jury Behavior, 3 LAW & HUM. 
BEHAV. 107 (1979).   
 15. E.g., Bornstein, supra note 10; Nancy Mehrkens Steblay et al., The Effects of Pre-
trial Publicity on Juror Verdicts: A Meta-Analytic Review, 23 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 219 
(1999). 
 16. See Richard E. Petty & John T. Cacioppo, The Elaboration Likelihood Model of 
Persuasion, in 19 ADVANCES IN EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 123 (Leonard Berko-
witz ed., 1986). For a very similar theory and an extensive literature review, see ALICE H. 
EAGLY & SHELLY CHAIKEN, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF ATTITUDES 305-25 (1993). 
 17. Indeed, perhaps the most important development in psychology in the past decade 
or so has been the convergent discovery (across various research domains) that the brain 
has at least two qualitatively different modes of reasoning—one fast, automatic, associa-
tive, and largely unconscious; the other slow, controlled, verbal, and largely conscious. See 
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tion” of information—that is, “thinking.” The “peripheral route” in-
volves a casual, and usually temporary, coloring of one’s views due to 
superficial cues (such as physical attractiveness or humor) or heuris-
tic “rules of thumb” (such as “more arguments are better than fewer 
arguments”). Peripheral cues are most influential when the persua-
sion target’s motivation or ability to scrutinize logical arguments is 
low. Argument quality becomes more important when motivation 
and ability are high. But studies testing this theory mostly examine 
reactions to consumer advertising, rather than explicit decision prob-
lems involving intellectual or moral judgment. The mock jury task, 
by contrast, is highly engaging. In recent mock jury research, even 
participants with relatively low motivation to scrutinize evidence 
were sensitive to argument quality.18 And as Bornstein and McCabe 
note, considerable research on the effects of incentives for accuracy—
even extremely large monetary rewards—has failed to show any con-
sistent effect on decision quality in cognitively engaging judgment 
tasks.19  
 Another possibility is that motivation favors a particular verdict 
option. For example, based on the standard decision theoretic ac-
count of trade-offs among false-positive and false-negative errors,20 
Bornstein and McCabe argue that if jurors are assumed to focus on 
avoiding false convictions of innocent people, then the greater the 
penalty severity, the greater the perceived cost of error.21 “As this 
perceived cost of error increases, jurors should require more evidence 
of guilt before voting to convict. With this shift in criterion, jurors 
should therefore be less likely to vote guilty when the penalty is more 
severe.”22 
 Ceteris paribus, this is a straightforward decision theory predic-
tion. But what it ignores is the fact that the other decision error—
falsely acquitting a guilty defendant—is also considerably more 
costly in actual trials. Thus, decision theory is mute unless there are 
compelling reasons to believe that the effects of realism are asym-
metric, increasing the cost of false positives more than the cost of 
false negatives. I suppose it is an empirical question, but a priori I 
see no particular reason to expect such an asymmetric effect. 
                                                                                                                    
KEITH E. STANOVICH, THE ROBOT’S REBELLION: FINDING MEANING IN THE AGE OF DARWIN 
31-79 (2004). 
 18. Donna Shestowsky & Leonard M. Horowitz, How the Need for Cognition Scale 
Predicts Behavior in Mock Jury Deliberations, 28 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 305, 333 (2004). 
 19. Bornstein & McCabe, supra note 1, at 465-66 & n.141; see also Colin F. Camerer 
& Robin M. Hogarth, The Effects of Financial Incentives in Experiments: A Review and 
Capital-Labor-Production Framework, 19 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 7 (1999). 
 20. See INSIDE THE JUROR, supra note 12; MacCoun, Experimental Research, supra 
note 3.  
 21. Bornstein & McCabe, supra note 1, at 460. 
 22. Id. at 460-61.  
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 Another relevant theoretical account is Irving Janis and Leon 
Mann’s 1977 conflict model.23 A full presentation is beyond the scope 
of this Comment, but in a nutshell, Janis and Mann distinguish 
three styles of decision under conflict and stress: vigilance (a careful 
and systematic weighing of costs and benefits), hypervigilance 
(roughly, “panic”), and defensive avoidance (preemptive efforts to ra-
tionalize or bolster what is expected to be an inevitable bad out-
come).24 Janis and Mann argue that vigilance can only occur under 
conditions of moderate stress and when there is an adequate time 
period for gathering and weighing information.25 When there is insuf-
ficient time, they predict hypervigilance.26 When every choice poses 
serious risks with no apparent solution, they predict defensive avoid-
ance.27 The Janis and Mann model has served an important role in 
helping researchers understand how real-world decision processes 
may depart from the standardized and idealized conditions of our 
laboratory experiments. Yet the model has no obvious implications 
for the comparison of mock and real jury trials. Real jury trials occur 
at a stately, almost glacial pace, without the urgency and immediacy 
faced by decisionmakers in the case studies examined by Janis and 
Mann. And while it may be that no verdict option offers a clear guar-
antee of success, as noted above, there is no clear reason why this is 
any more or less true in real trials than in the mock jury situation.
 Jennifer Lerner and Philip Tetlock have offered a related account 
of the effects of real-world pressures on human decisionmaking, fo-
cusing on the role of accountability.28 They argue that the effects of 
expecting to be held accountable for a decision will vary depending on 
whether the ‘decisionmaker knows the views of the various stake-
holders and other audiences that will scrutinize the decision.29 If the 
audience views are unknown, the decisionmaker will be motivated to 
engage in “preemptive self-criticism”30—analogous to the “vigilant” 
style of careful reasoning described by Janis and Mann.31 If the audi-
ence views are known, the decisionmaker will engage in some “atti-
tude shifting”—moving in the direction of the audience’s viewpoint.32 
                                                                                                                    
 23. IRVING L. JANIS & LEON MANN, A Conflict Model of Decision Making, in DECISION 
MAKING: A PSYCHOLOGICAL ANALYSIS OF CONFLICT, CHOICE, AND COMMITMENT 45, 45-80 
(1977).  
 24. Id. at 52-64.  
 25. Id. at 59. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Id. at 57-58.  
 28. See Jennifer S. Lerner & Philip E. Tetlock, Accounting for the Effects of Account-
ability, 125 PSYCHOL. BULL. 255 (1999). 
 29. See id. at 256-57.  
 30. Id. at 257. 
 31. See JANIS & MANN, supra note 23, at 59. 
 32. Lerner & Tetlock, supra note 28, at 256. Tetlock also considered what happens 
when one only discovers that one is accountable after a decision has already been ren-
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Presumably, real jurors are more accountable for their decisions than 
mock jurors; the stakes are higher and trials, by their very nature, 
are highly public acts.33 But the filtering process that produces trials 
almost guarantees that the “audience” will not share a single point of 
view. Litigants are under enormous pressure to settle or plea bargain 
when the evidence is stacked against them, and, to some extent, 
changes of venue and venire compensate for overwhelming public 
prejudice at odds with actual evidence strength. Again, it is hard to 
find clear a priori grounds for rejecting mock jury data on the basis of 
accountability effects. 
 In sum, there are a variety of theoretical perspectives in the 
judgment literature that suggest ways in which real-world behavior 
might depart from stylized laboratory tasks. But none of those theo-
ries offer clear predictions about the effects of jury verdict conse-
quentiality. That is not a shortcoming of the theories; rather, the 
variables they highlight are not variables that cleanly differentiate 
mock juries from real juries. 
 Implicit in the debate about mock jury realism is the notion that 
there are better research alternatives. The mock jury method is 
sometimes viewed as a “second-best” response to legal and ethical 
barriers to observing actual jury deliberations. But in point of fact, 
even absent those barriers, actual jury trials have many limitations 
for scientific research. There are inherent trade-offs among behav-
ioral science methods. Statistical analyses of actual jury verdicts, 
post-trial juror interviews, shadow juries, field experiments, and 
mock jury experiments each offer certain advantages, but also cer-
tain weaknesses.34 For example, statistical analysis of actual trial 
outcomes is an important research tool but is notoriously weak at es-
tablishing causation.35 Experimentation—specifically, random as-
signment to condition—is a powerful inferential tool for addressing 
causal questions that purely statistical analyses cannot answer. But 
there are many logistical, legal, and ethical barriers to the experi-
mental manipulation of variables of interest in actual trials, such as 
new rules of evidence, new procedures, litigant characteristics, or 
                                                                                                                    
dered. In such situations, accountability cannot affect the decision, but if the audience is 
dissatisfied, the decisionmaker may engage in “defensive bolstering” in an effort to ration-
alize the position—analogous to Janis and Mann’s notion of defensive avoidance. See id. at 
257-58; JANIS & MANN, supra note 23, at 57-58. 
 33. This is mitigated somewhat by the partial anonymity of jurors and the fact that 
they are not formally required to explain their verdicts. But increasingly aggressive media 
coverage is undermining both these caveats. 
 34. MacCoun, Inside the Black Box, supra note 3. 
 35. For example, alleged “deep-pocket” effects in compensatory damage awards ap-
parently result from the real-world confounding of defendant wealth with other factors 
that distinguish corporations from individual people. See Robert J. MacCoun, Differential 
Treatment of Corporate Defendants by Juries: An Examination of the “Deep-Pockets” Hy-
pothesis, 30 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 121 (1996). 
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variations in trial evidence. We should not rely solely on mock jury 
research, nor should we abandon it in the belief that “more realistic” 
methods are necessarily less vulnerable to faulty inference. Empiri-
cal progress requires triangulation across fallible sources of evidence. 
II.   JUDGES VERSUS JURIES 
 There is an entirely different sense in which the lack of grounding 
in “reality” might hinder sociolegal research. In many areas of re-
search on judgment and decisionmaking, progress is made by com-
paring a decisionmaker’s judgments to some independently deter-
mined criterion of “truth”: Did the radiologist correct identify a can-
cerous tumor? Did it rain when the meteorologist said it would? This 
approach relies on epistemology’s traditional “correspondence theory” 
of truth.36 In sociolegal research, we rarely have any independent cri-
terion—if we did, we probably would not rely on trials, at least not 
for factual questions.37 Instead, we either compare types of fact-
finders directly, or we compare factfinder performance to some nor-
mative theory that prescribes appropriate versus inappropriate 
sources of information and rules for combining that information.38  
 The recent judge-juror comparisons reviewed by Jennifer Robben-
nolt are noteworthy for use of both of these latter strategies in com-
bination.39 The direct judge-jury comparisons tell us whether these 
actors differ, but such comparisons do not tell us who was performing 
better; for example, we cannot simply assume that whatever the 
judges favor is the better judgment, unless perhaps the judgment in-
volves a narrow legal technicality. But the use of experimental tasks 
grounded in normative theories of inference is allowing researchers 
to calibrate these judge-jury differences relative to some independent 
standard for judgment. Of course, these inferential standards ad-
dress only the inferential dimension of legal factfinding; a full com-
parison of judges and juries must consider other factors, such as 




                                                                                                                    
 36. See KENNETH R. HAMMOND, HUMAN JUDGMENT AND SOCIAL POLICY: IRREDUCIBLE 
UNCERTAINTY, INEVITABLE ERROR, UNAVOIDABLE INJUSTICE (1996). 
 37. See Robert J. MacCoun, Epistemological Dilemmas in the Assessment of Legal De-
cision Making, 23 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 723, 728 (1999).  
 38. For a taxonomy of strategies for assessing judgment accuracy, see Reid Hastie & 
Kenneth A. Rasinski, The Concept of Accuracy in Social Judgment, in THE SOCIAL 
PSYCHOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE 193 (Daniel Bar-Tal & Arie W. Kruglanski eds., 1988). 
 39. See Robbennolt, supra note 2.  
 40. For public views of how judges and juries differ on these dimensions, see Robert J. 
MacCoun & Tom R. Tyler, The Basis of Citizens’ Perceptions of the Criminal Jury: Proce-
dural Fairness, Accuracy, and Efficiency, 12 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 333 (1988). 
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 Testing performance relative to explicit theories of performance 
may offer a rhetorical advantage in addition to any scientific bene-
fits. It may be naïve for mock jury researchers to hope to influence 
policy using our empirical findings. Empirical research by economet-
ricians plays an important role in legal policy, but its influence 
surely pales by comparison to the theoretical impact of the law and 
economics movement, which emphasizes ideas over data. Mock jury 
experiments are particularly well-suited for testing our ideas about 
how legal factfinding occurs, but if we want to influence legal policy-
making, offering good arguments may be more powerful than defend-
ing arguably good data. 
 
